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I. Introduction 
The relationship between government and religion is a difficult one. The question of how 
religious beliefs and practices should be treated by the government remains at the forefront of 
constitutional debate. There are concerns about religious freedom and the extent to which it 
conflicts with public duty. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states, 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof." The Supreme Court's interpretation of the religion clauses has been unclear, 
inconsistent, and, therefore, extremely controversial. In fact, it has not become less controversial 
over time, but quite the opposite. 
There has been no single standard of analysis of the establishment clause and the free 
exercise clause over the last two decades. In general, the establishment clause has been 
interpreted by the Court as prohibiting aid to religion, a particular religion, or a persodgroup 
because of herlhislits religion. The free exercise clause has been interpreted as prohibiting h a m  
to religion, a particular religion, or a persodgroup because of herlhislits religion. Like all 
constitutional prohibitions, the religion clauses are not absolute prohibitions. Some aid and harm 
is allowed under the establishment clause and free exercise clause, respectively. Therefore, the 
crucial issue with respect to both clauses is where the line should be drawn between aid or harm 
that is allowed and that which is not allowed. 
Two of the justices who have contributed significantly to the Court's adjudication of 
religion clause cases are former Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor. William Rehnquist was nominated Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States by President Nixon on October 21, 1971. He was then nominated Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States by President Reagan on June 17, 1986 and served on the 
Court until his death in 2005.' Throughout his time on the Court, Rehnquist fought against the 
expansion of federal powers and strongly advocated states' rightx2 He believes that the only 
rights protected by the Constitution are explicitly stated in the document and that justices should 
consider the Framers' original intent when interpreting the Constitution. Therefore, he is known 
for his legal philosophy of judicial restraint, which interprets the U.S Constitution narrowly.' 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was nominated to be the first woman justice to sit on the 
Supreme Court of the United States in 1981 by President Reagan. She remained on the Court 
until her retirement in 2006. Unlike Rehnquist, O'Connor's core legal philosophy is difficult to 
define. She is known to approach each case individually in order to arrive at a practical 
conclusion." 
In the first section of the paper, I will discuss Justice Rehnquist's and Justice O'Connor's 
interpretation and application of the religion clauses, respectively. I will then explain the 
similarities and differences between the two justices' approaches to the interpretation of the 
establishment clause and the free exercise clause. After discussing the main differences between 
Rehnquist's and O'Connor's religion clause jurisprudence in the second section of the paper, I 
will decide which justice has a clear and workable standard for distinguishing between aid or 
harm that is constitutional and that which is not constitutional. Therefore, the third and final 
section of the paper will take a position on which justice has the soundest approach in his or her 
interpretation and application of the religion clauses. The ultimate goal of my study will be to 
reach a reasoned and defensible conclusion regarding which justice's interpretation of the 
' "William Huhhs Rehnquist, Biographical Data." CorneN Law School. 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/supcWjusticesirehnquist.bio.html> 
"William H. Rehnquist, Biography." Oyez.com. < http://www.oyez.org/justices/williamamhhrehnquistb 
"Chief Justice Rehnquist has died!' CNN.com. September 4,2005. 
<http://w.cnn.com/2005/LAW/09/O3/rehnquist.obit/index.html~ 
"'Sandra Day O'Connor, Biography." 0yez.com. < http:llwww.oyez.orgijustices/sandra~dayYoconnori> 
religion clauses is most persuasive and whether it ought to be adopted by the Court, including its 
newest members. 
11. Justice William Rehnquist 
A. Rehnquist 's Method of Constitutional Interpretation 
One of the major problems associated with broadly-worded provisions such as the 
religion clauses is how to decide what sources justices should use to interpret the text. One 
approach is the original understanding approach, which argues that it is only the original 
meaning that has the authority to override later majority  action^.^ An opposing theory of 
constitutional interpretation is the moral understanding approach. This approach maintains that 
the Constitution reflects certain general principles of political morality. Therefore, regardless of 
the understanding of the drafters, justices must translate these principles in the best way into 
current circumstances. In this way, it is argued, the Constitution is able to adapt to changes that 
have occurred since the adoption of the ~onsti tut ion.~ 
Justice Rehnquist has a clear legal philosophy based upon original understanding. Since 
Rehnquist believes that the only rights protected by the Constitution are explicitly stated in the 
document, he argues that justices should employ an original understanding approach. This 
approach focuses on determining the historical meaning of the words as they were understood by 
the generation in which they were enacted. 
Perhaps the most important opinion written by Justice William Rehnquist regarding the 
interpretation of the religion clauses is his dissenting opinion in Wallace v. JaSfree. In this 
opinion, he explains that the Constitution should be interpreted on the basis of its original 
meaning. Thus, he writes, "The true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in its 
5 Berg, Thomas. The State and Religion in a Nutshell. (Thomson West, 2004), 1 I 
6 Id., 12. 
7 WaNace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting) 
hi~tory ,"~ and adds, "If a constitutional theory has no basis in the history of the amendment it 
seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results, 1 see little use in i tn9 
Rehnquist has frequently criticized the Supreme Court for its misreading of the original meaning 
of the religion clauses, especially the establishment c~ause . '~  
In his dissent, Rehnquist criticizes an interpretation based upon the separation of church 
and state because it is not supported by historical evidence. He writes, "'The wall of separation 
between church and state' is a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved 
useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned."" Rehnquist 
believes that the actions of the First Congress, as well as other primary sources and the historical 
circumstances surrounding the Bill of Rights, should be looked at to ascertain the original 
meaning of the clauses. He cites letters and statements made by Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison in his Jaffree dissent, in addition to what was said and done at the First Congress, as 
examples of historical evidence used in an original understanding approach.I2 Rehnquist 
supports the use of historical evidence to interpret the religion clauses and not what the Court has 
added to their original meaning. Therefore, Rehnquist's approach regarding the interpretation of 
the religion clauses is based upon a belief that they should be understood based upon the words 
contained in the clause and the primary sources, historical circumstances, and congressional 
proceedings that produced them. 
On the other hand, because the religion clauses have been incorporated into the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and thereby applied to the states, even though 
8 Id., 114. 
Id., 113. 
10 Derek Davis, Original Intent: ChiefJustice Rehnquist and the Course of American Church/State Relations, 
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991), 83. 
I I Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U . S .  38, 107 (1985) ( J .  Rehnquist, dissenting). 
Id.. 99. 
originally they were only intended to apply to the federal government, Rehnquist has stated that 
he is not sure how the clauses, as applied to the states, should now be interpreted. In his 
dissenting opinion in Thomas v. Review Board, Rehnquist states that the Court has 
misinterpreted the religion clauses and, thus, created "tension" between them. He contends that 
"the decision by this Court that the First Amendment was 'incorporated' into the Fourteenth 
Amendment and thereby made applicable against the States" is one of the causes of this 
tension." Nevertheless, he does accept the application of the clauses to the states, even though 
he may disagree with it. Thus, Rehnquist says, "Given the 'incorporation' of the Establishment 
Clause as against the States via the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson, States are prohibited as 
well from establishing a religion or discriminating between sects."I4 
Another issue that Rehnquist has addressed is the meaning of the word "religion" in the 
First Amendment. He did this most clearly in his dissent in Thomas v. Review Board and Elk 
Grove Unified School District v. ~ e w d o w . "  In Thomas, Rehnquist distinguishes between 
religion and personal philosophical choices. He writes, 
"In this case, the Supreme Court of Indiana 'found the basis and the precise nature of Thomas' 
belief unclear' and concluded that the belief was more 'personal philosophical choice' than 
religious belief. The Court's failure to make clear whether it accepts or rejects this finding by the 
Indiana Supreme Court, the highest court of the State, suggests that a person who leaves his job 
for purely 'personal philosophical choices' will be constitutionally entitled to unemployment 
benefits. If that is true, the implications of today's decision are enormous. Persons will then be able 
to quit their jobs, assert they did so for personal reasons, and collect unemployment insurance."16 
This suggests that Rehnquist believes that the First Amendment draws a line between religion 
and personal philosophy. 
Rehnquist also differentiates between religion and our nation's religious history and 
character. In his Newdow opinion, he writes, "The phrase 'under God' in the Pledge seems, as a 
'"homos v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707,722 (1981) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting). 
'"allace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 114 (1985) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting). 
" Elk Grove UnijiedSchool District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 ,27  (2004) (J. Rehnquist, concurring). 
16 Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707,724 (1981) (I. Rehnquist, dissenting). 
historical matter, to sum up the attitude of the Nation's leaders, and to manifest itself in many of 
our public obse~ances ." '~  In addition, Rehnquist argues, "I do not believe that the phrase 'under 
God' in the Pledge converts its recital into a 'religious exercise' of the sort described in Lee. 
Instead, it is a declaration of belief in allegiance and loyalty to the United States flag and the 
Republic that it represents. The phrase 'under God' is in no sense a prayer, nor an endorsement 
of any religion, but a simple recognition of the fact.'"' He acknowledges that our people and our 
institutions reflect the tradition that our nation was founded on a fundamental belief in God. 
However, he states that reciting or listening to the pledge is not a religious exercise, but a 
patriotic one, because no one promises to adhere to a particular God, faith, or church. Rather, 
participants promise fidelity to our flag and our nation.I9 Therefore, Rehnquist acknowledges 
that there is a difference between religion and the role it has played in our history. 
Rehnquist also reconciles the role played by religion and religious traditions throughout 
our nation's history with the relationship between government and religion in the majority 
opinion in Van Orden v.   err^.'' This case dealt with the display of the Ten Commandments on 
government property outside the Texas State Capitol and whether the public display violated the 
establishment clause. Rehnquist's argument is similar to his argument in Newdow. He states 
that acknowledgement of the role that the Ten Commandments have played throughout our 
nation's history is extremely common in America. 
Rehnquist summarizes the relationship between religion and government based upon two 
competing faces. He writes, "One face looks toward the strong role played by religion and 
religious traditions throughout our Nation's history.. .The other face looks toward the principle 
17 Elk Grove Uni@edSchool Disrricrv. Newdow, 542 U . S .  1, 27 (2004) (J. Rehnquist, concurring), 
111.. ^ ^  
.- la., u. 
l 9  I L ~ .  
20 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 US. 677 (2005) (J. Rehnquist, majority). 
that governmental intervention in religious matters can itself endanger religious freedom. This 
case, like all Establishment Clause challenges, presents us with the difficulty of respecting both 
faces. Our institutions presuppose a Supreme Being, yet these institutions must not press 
religious observances upon their citizens."" He concludes that although the display of the Ten 
Commandments has religious significance, it also represents the nation's political and legal 
history.22 Rehnquist, once again, emphasizes the American tradition of religious 
acknowledgements and its consistency with previous Court opinions. 
B. Rehnquist 's Interpretution of the Establishment Clause 
Rehnquist narrowly interprets what the establishment clause prohibits. After discussing 
the history surrounding the adoption of the religion clauses, Rehnquist concludes, "It would 
seem from this evidence that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment had acquired a 
well-accepted meaning: it forbade establishment of a national religion, and forbade preference 
among religious sects or  denomination^."^' He believes that the government must be neutral 
toward different religions but does not have to be neutral toward religion and irreligion. 
According to Rehnquist, the establishment clause prohibits "government support of proselytizing 
activities of religious sects by throwing the weight of secular [authorities] behind the 
dissemination of religious tenets" and "purposeful assistance directly to the church itself or to 
some reIigious group.. .performing ecclesiastical  function^."^^ Therefore, Rehnquist believes 
that the establishment clause prohibits only laws that advance a particular religion and not those 
that advance religion in general or all religions equally. He writes, "The Establishment Clause 
did not require government neutrality between religion and irreligion, nor did it prohibit the 
2 1  Id., 684. 
22 Id., 692. 
23 Wallace v. Jafiee, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (1. Rehnquist, dissenting). 
24 Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707,727 (1981) (I. Rehnquist, dissenting) 
Federal Government from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion."2 Discriminatory, or 
preferential aid, is aid that goes to one particular religion or some, but not all religions. 
Therefore, Rehnquist believes that direct aid that is preferential in nature is prohibited by the 
establishment clause. 
An example of a law that aids religion in general or all religions equally that Rehnquist is 
willing to allow is found in Stone v. Graham. This case involved a Kentucky statute requiring 
the posting of the Ten Commandments in public schools.26 Rehnquist writes, "The Court's 
emphasis on the religious nature of the first part of the Ten Commandments is beside the point. 
The document as a whole has had significant secular impact, and the Constitution does not 
require that Kentucky students see only an expurgated or redacted version containing only the 
elements with directly traceable secular effects."27 Since Rehnquist thinks that the primary 
purposeleffect of the law is secular in nature, which in this case is to teach good morals, the aid 
to religion is secondary or indirect. Therefore, Rehnquist is willing to allow government aid to 
particular religions so long as the aid is secondary andlor indirect. 
Rehnquist's argument in Mueller v. Allen, which upheld tax deduction for certain 
expenses incurred in sending one's child to a religious school, also clearly illustrates his position 
that secondary or indirect aid to religion is permissible. He argues that the State's decision to 
reduce parents' cost in sending their children to school has a purpose that is both secular and 
understandable: education.28 Although Rehnquist acknowledges that religious institutions may 
benefit very substantially from the allowance of such deductions, this does not render such 
'j Wallace v .  Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting) 
 tone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, (1980) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting). 
" Id., 46. 
" Mueller v .  Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 396, (1983), (J. Rehnquist, majority). 
provisions of a State's tax law as violations under the establishment clause.29 This is because 
Rehnquist believes that if a particular religion benefits indirectly or secondarily from the law, it 
does not matter so long as the primary purpose and effect of the law is secular. 
Rehnquist's opinion in Van Orden v. Perry remains consistent with his previous 
decisions in Stone v. Graham and Mueller v. Allen. This case involved the display of the Ten 
Commandments on government property outside the Texas State Capitol. Rehnquist's analysis 
in Van Orden is dependent upon the purpose and nature of the monument.30 He acknowledges 
that the Ten Commandments are religious in nature and that the monument has religious 
significance but argues that "Simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent 
with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment   la use."^' Rehnquist states that 
the monument's primary purpose and effect is secular and thus, does not violate the First 
Amendment. He writes, "Indeed, we need not decide in this case the extent to which a primarily 
religious purpose would affect our analysis because it is clear from the record that there is no 
evidence of such a purpose in this case."32 In other words, if the primary purpose and effect of a 
law is secular in nature, then it does not matter to Rehnquist if a particular religion benefits 
indirectly or secondarily from the law. 
Another establishment clause issue that Rehnquist addresses is whether the aid to religion 
is coming primarily from the government or from private persons or groups. Santa Fe v. 
Independent School District v. Doe clearly addresses this question, because the issue in that case 
was whether a Texas school district policy authorizing a high school student's delivery of an 
"invocation andlor message" before home varsity football games violates the establishment of 
29 Id., 397. 
'' Van Orden v. Perry. 545 U.S. 687 (2005) (J.  Rehnquist, majority) 
31 Id., 691. 
32 Id., 692. 
11 
religion clause.33 Rehnquist argues that "the Court misconstrues the nature of the 'majoritarian 
election' permitted by the policy as being an election on 'prayer' and 'religion.' To the contrary, 
the election permitted by the policy is a two-fold process whereby students vote first on whether 
to have a student speaker before football games at all, and second, if the students vote to have 
such a speaker, on who that speaker will be."34 He continues, "But it is possible that the students 
might vote not to have a pregame speaker, in which case there would be no threat of a 
constitutional violation. It is also possible that the election would not focus on prayer, but on 
public speaking ability or social popularity. And if the student campaigning did begin to focus 
on prayer, the school might decide to implement reasonable campaign  restriction^."^^ Rehnquist 
determined that the election was enough to prevent the private aid to religion on the part of the 
students from becoming government aid that violates the establishment clause. 
It can be concluded that Rehnquist believes that the establishment clause prohibits only 
laws that directly and primarily advance a particular religion or some, but not all religions. 
Therefore, he believes that nondiscriminatory, indirect aid to religion in general or all religions 
equally is constitutional. What matters for Rehnquist is whether a law's primary purpose or 
effect is secular. If it is, then it should be upheld even though it benefits some religions to some 
degree. 
C. Rehnquist S Interpretation ofthe Free Exercise Clause 
One of the main issues associated with the interpretation of the free exercise clause is 
distinguishing between harm that is constitutional and that which is not constitutional. There are 
two ways that a law might harm religion or burden the free exercise thereof: directly or primarily 
and indirectly or secondarily. A law that directly or primarily harms religion is one that singles 
" Snntn Fe IndependentSchool District v. Doe, 530 U.S .  290 (2000) (1. Rehnquist, dissenting). 
l' Id., 821. 
'' Id., 822. 
out conduct for restriction simply because it is religious. A law that indirectly or secondarily 
harms religion occurs when religious conduct is not singled out for prohibition, but collides with 
a general standard of conduct imposed on all citizens equally.j6 When a law directly threatens 
the free exercise of religion, the issue is whether the law itself is constitutional. However, when 
it only indirectly does so, the issue is not whether the law is constitutional, but whether the 
personlgroup whose free exercise of religion is threatened by the law should be exempt from 
having to obey the law. Some justices, like O'Connor, believe that it does and favor granting 
exemptions. Rehnquist, however, does not. 
There are very few free exercise cases involving direct government harm to religion. 
However, there have been several cases involving a law that discriminated against a religious 
group. The Court struck down those laws, but on the grounds that they violated the group's 
freedom of speech andlor press. One such case was Rosenberger v. Universify of Virginia, in 
which the university refused to provide funding for a publication because it "primarily promotes 
or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality."j7 The Court had to 
determine whether the University of Virginia violated the First Amendment rights of its 
Christian magazine staff by denying them the same funding resources that it made available to 
secular student-run magazines. Rehnquist agreed with the Court's decision, which is that if the 
government is going to provide aid, financial or otherwise, to all kinds of groups or activities, it 
cannot exclude religious groups and activities from receiving the aid without violating their 
freedom of speech. 
Regarding laws that discriminate against a religious group, Rehnquist addressed the 
question of whether or not a law that provides funds for all kinds of education but excludes the 
36 Berg 28. 
37 Rosenberger v. Unhersity of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (J.  Kennedy, majority). 
use of those funds to pay for a theological education is unconstitutional in Locke v. Davey. In his 
opinion, Rehnquist addresses whether a policy denying scholarship money to those individuals 
pursuing a devotional degree violates the free exercise clause.38 In his discussion, he says that 
not all harm (in this case a "minor burden") to religion is prohibited under the free exercise 
clause. Rehnquist explains, "The State's interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees 
is substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on Promise 
~cholars."'~ in addition, he writes, "We believe that the entirety of the Promise Scholarship 
Program goes a long way toward including religion in its benefits. The program permits students 
to attend pervasively religious schools, so long as they are a~credited."~' According to 
Rehnquist, so long as the government does not require students to choose between their 
particular religious beliefs and receiving a governmental benefit, the government is permitted to 
deny funding to a certain group of individuals, even if it places a minor burden upon that group. 
The main issue associated with the interpretation of the free exercise clause is whether it 
guarantees religion-based exemptions from valid, secular laws that most persons have to obey. 
Since Rehnquist does not believe that the free exercise clause guarantees religion-based 
exemptions from generally applicable laws, he is willing to allow some restrictions or burdens on 
the free exercise of religion. While Rehnquist believes that the free exercise clause prohibits 
directly targeting and harming a particular religion or religion in general, he believes that 
indirect, unintended harm to religion is allowed under the free exercise clause. 
Rehnquist strongly believes that the free exercise clause does not guarantee a right to 
religion-based exemptions from valid, secular laws that are generally applicable. He writes, "I 
believe that, although a State could choose to grant exemptions to religious persons from 
Locke v.  Davey. 520 U.S. 712,726 (2004) (J .  Rehnquist, majority). 
"Id. 
Id., 725. 
state.. .regulations, a State is not constitutionally required to do ~ 0 . " ~ '  He explains, "Where ... a 
state has enacted a general statute, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's 
secular goals, the Free Exercise Clause does not, in my view, require the State to conform that 
statute to the dictates of religious conscience to any If a law has a primarily secular 
purpose and effect, then indirect harm, just like indirect aid, is allowed. 
According to Rehnquist, the state of Indiana did not violate the free exercise clause in 
Thomas v. Review Board when it enacted an unemployment statute that provided no exemptions 
for religious reasons from a rule that prohibited persons who refused to work for personal 
reasons from receiving unemployment compensation. He determines that Thomas was not 
singled out by the state and, therefore, there is no reason for the Court to single him out for 
special exemption. Rehnquist concludes that the state has the right to make its own judgments 
about the kind of exemptions, if any, it would grant.43 Therefore, Rehnquist contends that 
indirect, nondiscriminatory ham1 is always allowed under the free exercise clause. 
Rehnquist elaborates upon this view in his majority opinion in Goldman v.  Weinberger, 
which addressed whether a Jewish Air Force officer who wanted to wear a yarmulke while on 
duty indoors had a right to be exempt from an Air Force regulation relating to uniforms." He 
explains, "But the First Amendment does not require the military to accommodate such practices 
in the face of its view that they would detract from the uniformity sought by the dress 
regulations.. .The Air Force has drawn the line essentially between religious appeal that is visible 
and that which is not, and we hold that those portions of the regulations challenged here 
reasonably and evenhandedly regulate dress in the interest of the military's perceived need for 
41 Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 724 (1981) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting). 
41 Id. 
4, Davis 121. 
44 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.  503, 5 1 1  (1986) (J. Rehnquist, majority). 
uni f~rmi t~ . "~ '  He contends that accommodation is not required due to an overriding interest, the 
need of the military to ensure uniformity. Therefore, it is clear that Rehnquist believes the free 
exercise clause does not guarantee a right to religion-based exemptions from valid, secular laws 
that are generally applicable. 
It seems that Rehnquist would vote to uphold virtually any law that does not directly and 
obviously interfere with religious exercise. Rehnquist's understanding of the religion clauses 
allows governments at all levels to accommodate and support religious practices if they choose 
to do so. Therefore, he also believes that governments at all levels may limit religious practices 
if they choose to do so.46 In addition, Rehnquist's lengthy dissent in Thomas exhibits his view 
that if state and local governments pass valid, generally applicable laws prohibiting conduct that 
conflicts with a citizen's religious beliefs or conduct, then the government regulation will 
prevail.47 
It can be concluded that Rehnquist believes that the free exercise clause prohibits direct 
harm to religion. He also believes that indirect, unintended harm to religion is permitted under 
the free exercise clause. When a law indirectly harms religion, the issue is not whether the law is 
constitutional, but whether the personlgroup whose free exercise of religion is threatened by the 
law should be exempt from having to obey the law. Since he believes that indirect, unintended 
harm to religion is permissible, he does not favor granting religion-based exemptions from 
generally applicable laws. 
D. Rehnquist on How to Resolve the Tension between the Two Clauses 
Because Rehnquist narrowly interprets both the free exercise clause and the 
establishment clause, be does not think that the two clauses necessarily conflict with one another. 
45 Id. 
46 Davis 128. 
47 Id.. 150. 
Although he admits that there is tension between the free exercise clause and the establishment 
clause in the Court's opinions, he believes that "the 'tension' is largely of this Court's own 
making, and would diminish almost to the vanishing point if the Clauses were properly 
interp~eted."~~ Rehnquist adds, "I would agree that the Establishment Clause, properly 
interpreted, would not be violated if Indiana voluntarily chose to grant unemployment benefits to 
those persons who left their jobs for religious reasons. But I also believe that the decision below 
is inconsistent with many of our prior Establishment Clause cases. Those cases, if faithfully 
applied, would require us to hold that such voluntary action by a State did violate the 
Establishment Rehnquist is saying that if a state were required to grant religion-based 
exemptions from valid, secular laws, it would come dangerously close to "establishing" religion 
under the Court's current interpretation of the establishment clause. This implies that Rehnquist 
believes that a narrower interpretation of both the free exercise and the establishment clause will 
resolve the existing tension between the two clauses. 
Justice Rehnquist's call for a narrower interpretation of both the establishment clause and 
the free exercise clause reflects the principle of benevolent neutrality. Rather than call for 
complete neutrality between religion and irreligion, Rehnquist believes that only neutrality 
among particular religions is required by the religion clauses. For Rehnquist, the natural 
corollary to the permissible accommodation of religion under the establishment clause is the 
permissible restriction of religion under the free exercise clause. Rehnquist's interpretation of 
the establishment clause allows for the accommodation of religion, while on the other hand, his 
interpretation of the free exercise clause does not accommodate religion. In both cases, 
'' Thornas v. Review Board. 450 U.S. 707,723 (1981) (1. Rehnquist, dissenting). 
49 Id., 725. 
Rehnquist is deferring to majoritarian democracy.50 Such an approach, according to Rehnquist, 
would solve the problems created by the Court. 
111. Justice Sandra Day 0 'Connor 
A. 0 'Connor's Method of Constitutional Interpretation 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor interprets the free exercise clause and establishment clause 
on the basis of their original meaning. However, whereas she finds the original meaning of the 
free exercise clause to be clear, she does not find the meaning of the establishment clause to be 
as clear. In her dissenting opinion in City of Boernes v. Flores, she relies on historical evidence 
to cast doubt on the Court's current interpretation of the free exercise clause.51 She writes, "The 
record instead reveals that its drafters and ratifiers more likely viewed the Free Exercise Clause 
as a guarantee that the government may not unnecessarily hinder believers from freely practicing 
their religion."52 O'Connor uses historical evidence to show that when religious beliefs conflict 
with civil law, the free exercise clause was originally meant to allow religion to prevail unless 
important state interests require otherwise. She explains, "Although the Framers may not have 
asked precisely the questions about religious liberty that we do today, the historical record 
indicates that they believed that the Constitution affirmatively protects religious free exercise and 
that it limits the government's ability to intrude on religious practice."53 In order to discern the 
original meaning of the free exercise clause, O'Connor discusses the existence of state 
constitutional provisions, the practice of colonies and early states in regards to religion, and the 
writings of early leaders who helped to shape our Nation. 
50 Davis 150. 
J I  Ciry ofBoernes v. Flores. 521 U.S. 507, 550 (1997) (J. O'Connor, dissenting) 
52 id. 
>' Id., 551. 
Although O'Connor primarily relies upon the original meaning of the religion clauses, 
she is not limited by it when that meaning is unclear. In her concurring opinion in Wallace v. 
Jaffree, she explains, "This uncertainty as to the intent of the Framers of the Bill of Rights does 
not mean we should ignore history for guidance on the role of religion in public education. The 
Court has not done so. When the intent of the Framers is unclear, I believe we must employ both 
history and reason in our analysis."54 This suggests that O'Connor primarily relies upon an 
original understanding approach when interpreting the establishment clause but is not limited by 
it when that meaning is unclear. 
Another issue that O'Connor has addressed, although briefly, is the meaning of the word 
"religion" in the First Amendment. O'Connor fails to differentiate between religion and personal 
philosophical choice like Rehnquist does. However, she does vaguely address the question of 
what constitutes religion in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow. In Newdow, 
O'Connor distinguishes between religion and ceremonial deism. She acknowledges that the 
Court has permitted the government, in some instances, to refer to or commemorate religion in 
public life and believes "that although those references speak to the language of religious belief, 
they are more properly understood as employing the idiom for essentially secular purposes."55 
One such purpose is the role of religion in our history. 
O'Connor also uses history to affirm the view that religious freedom is so fundamental 
that it is appropriate for the Court to apply it to the states via the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. In McCreary County v ACLU, O'Connor discusses the Founders' plan 
to preserve religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society.56 She writes, 
"Our guiding principle has been James Madison's--that '[tlhe Religion . . . of every man must be 
54 Wallace v. Jafiee, 472 U . S .  38, 82 (1985) (I. O'Connor, concurring). 
55 Elk Grove Unlfied School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 ,36 (2004) (1. O'Connor, concurring) 
56 McCreaty County v. ACLU, 545 U.S .  844, 883 (2005) (I. O'Connor, concurring). 
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left to the conviction and conscience of every man.' To that end, we have held that the 
guarantees of religious freedom protect citizens from religious incursions by the States as well as 
by the Federal ~overnment."~' It can be inferred through O'Connor's discussion of the 
importance of religious liberty that she supports the incorporation of the religion clauses into the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus, their application to the states. 
O'Connor distinguishes between the free exercise clause and the establishment clause on 
the basis of coercion. Although proof of coercion provides a basis for a claim under the fiee 
exercise clause, it is not a necessary element of a claim under the establishment clause.58 
O'Connor writes, "An Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only 'coercive' practices or 
overt efforts at government proselytization, but fails to take account of the numerous more subtle 
ways that government can show favoritism to particular beliefs or convey a message of 
disapproval to others, would not, in my view, adequately protect the religious liberty or respect 
the religious diversity of the members of our pluralistic political ~ommuni ty . "~~  Whereas the 
fiee exercise clause is limited to direct coercion, the establishment clause is not. Merely 
showing favoritism to particular beliefs or religion in general is enough to provide the basis for a 
claim under the establishment clause. 
B. O'Connor 's Interpretation o f  the Establishment Clause 
In her establishment clause analysis, O'Connor uses the endorsement test. According to 
it, if a statute's primary purpose or effect is to convey a message of government endorsement or 
disapproval of a particular religion or religion in general, it violates the establishment clause. 
O'Connor's endorsement test relies on whether an objective observer, familiar with the text, 
" Id. 
County ofAllegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,629 (1989) (1. 
O'Connor, concurring). 
59 Id., 629. 
legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive a government message 
either favoring or disfavoring of religion in general or of a particular religion. In addition, the 
endorsement test requires that the government not make religion relevant to a person's standing 
in the political community.60 
In Wallace v. Jaffree, O'Connor argues that "the endorsement test does not preclude the 
government from acknowledging religion or taking religion into account in making law and 
policy. It does preclude government from attempting to convey a message that religion or a 
particular religious belief is favored or preferred."6' O'Comor writes, "What is crucial is that a 
government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of government 
endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that effect, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to 
status in the political community."62 
O'Comor clearly addresses the importance of public perception in determining the 
presence of endorsement or disapproval of religion in general or a particular religion. In her 
concurring opinion in Mitchell v. Helms, she argues that in terms of public perception, a 
government program of direct aid to religious schools based on the number of students attending 
each school differs meaningfully from the government distributing aid directly to individual 
 student^."^ She writes, "I believe the distinction between a per-capita school-aid program and a 
true private-choice program is significant for purposes of endor~ement."~~ O'Comor continues, 
"In terms of public perception, a government program of direct aid to religious schools based on 
the number of students attending each school differs meaningfully from the government 
distributing aid directly to individual students who, in turn, decide to use the aid at the same 
religious schools. In the former example, if the religious school uses the aid to inculcate religion in 
60 Lynch v. Dormelly, 465 U.S. 668,693 (1984) (I. O'Connor, concurring). 
" Wallace v. Jaffreer. 472 U.S. 38,71 (1985) (I. O'Connor, concurring). 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,693 (1984) (I. O'Connor, concurring). 
63 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793,844 (2000) (I. O'Connor, concurring). 
'' ld., 843. 
its students, it is reasonable ta say that the government has communicated a message of 
endorsement. Because the religious indoctrination is supported by government assistance, the 
reasonable observer would naturally perceive the aid program as government support for the 
advancement of religion. That the amount of aid received by the school is based on the school's 
enrollment does not separate the government from the endorsement of the religious message."65 
O'Connor contends that direct aid is unconstitutional because it necessarily entails endorsement. 
There are three important cases that illustrate O'Connor's acceptance of the use of state 
funds for religious purposes.66 In Lynch v. Donnelly, O'Connor upheld state support for a 
Christmas nativity display on the grounds that it primarily served the secular purpose of 
celebrating a public holiday.h7 She determined that the establishment clause permitted the use of 
state funds for religious purposes when the purpose was secular and did not constitute a message 
of endorsement. In a second case, Rosenberger v. Universitj of Virginia, O'Connor explained 
that the university's public financing of a religious periodical, along with student news, 
information, opinion, entertainment, or academic communications media groups, would not 
violate the Establishment Because the university subsidized such a wide array of 
activities and expression, it was extremely unlikely that anyone would think that the university 
itself endorsed any particular message communicated by the student groups whose activities it 
financed.69 In a third case, Mitchell v. Helms, O'Connor determined that "in contrast, when 
government aid supports a school's religious mission only because of independent decisions 
made by numerous individuals to guide their secular aid to that school, 'no reasonable observer 
is likely to draw from the facts.. .an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice 
or belief."'70 These three cases all show a clear application of O'Connor's endorsement test. If a 
Id., 844, 
66 Brownstein, Alan. "A Decent Respect for Religious Liberty and Religious Equality: Justice 
O'Connor's Interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment." McGeorge 
Law Review,: Spring, 2001, 864. 
67 Lynch v. Donnelly. 465 U.S. 688 (1984) (J. O'Connor, concurring). 
68 Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 853 (1995) (J. O'Connor, concurring). 
"Id. - 
Mitchellv. H e b s ,  530 U.S. 793, 844 (2000) (J. O'Connor, concurring) 
law does not have the primary purpose or effect of endorsing or disfavoring religion in general or 
a particular religion, it is constitutional. 
O'Connor does not remain committed to the endorsement test in all of her opinions, 
however. In Board of Education of Ki\liryas Joel v. Grumet, she fails to adhere to a single test 
under the establishment clause. She writes, "But the same constitutional principle may operate 
very differently in different contexts.. .And setting forth a unitary test for a broad set of cases 
may sometimes do more harm than good."7' O'Connor continues, stating that her endorsement 
test is not the only test that should be used. She writes, "Relatively simple phrases like 'primary 
effect.. .that neither advances nor inhibits religion' and 'entanglement' acquire more and more 
complicated definitions which stray even further from their literal meaning. Distinctions are 
drawn between statutes whose effect is to advance religion and statutes whose effect is to allow 
religious organizations to advance religion."72 This leads her to conclude that, "Experience 
proves that the Establishment Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, cannot easily be reduced to a 
single test. There are different categories of Establishment Clause cases, which may call for 
different approaches."73 She discusses four different categories of establishment clause cases 
and says that different tests should be used for each of them. O'Connor differentiates between 
cases that involve government action targeted at particular individuals, cases involving 
government speech on religious topics, cases in which the government must make decisions 
about matters of religious doctrine and religious law, and cases involving government 
delegations of power to religious bodies.74 If there is no single test for deciding establishment 
clause cases, then this implies that there is no single interpretation of the clause. O'Connor's 
1 l Board ofEducation ofKiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S.  687,719 (1994) (J. O'Connor, concurring). 
72 Id., 720. 
73 Id., 721. 
Grumet opinion varies significantly from her opinions in other establishment clause cases in 
which she applied the endorsement test. 
Although O'Connor believes government endorsement of religion or a particular religion 
is prohibited under the establishment clause, she is willing to allow for the "accommodation" of 
religion. This means that she supports, in certain situations, accommodating or exempting 
religious conduct in the face of general laws. Corporation ofpresiding Bishop v. Amos involved 
a janitor employed at a nonprofit gymnasium which was operated by nonprofit corporations 
affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Because the employee failed to 
qualify for a "temple recommendation" certifying that he was a member of the church, he was 
discharged. After he was discharged, the janitor alleged that he faced discrimination in 
employment on the basis of religion, thus violating 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The 
corporations moved to dismiss the claim on the basis of 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which exempts religious organizations from bans on religious discrimination in employment.76 
O'Connor concluded that 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did exempt the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints from a generally applicable regulatory burden and did not violate the 
establishment clause. 
In her opinion, O'Connor determined that an objective observer, according to her 
endorsement test, would perceive government support of the church's right to hire and fire 
employees on the basis of religion as an accommodation of religion rather than government 
endorsement of religion.77 She writes, "The necessary first step in evaluating an Establishment 
Clause challenge to a government action lifting from religious organizations a generally 
applicable regulatory burden is to recognize that such government action does have the effect of 
l5 Corporation ofpresiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S.  327,348 (1987) (J. O'Connor, concurring). 
76 Id. 
'' Id., 349. 
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advancing religion. The necessary second step is to separate those benefits to religion that 
constitutionally accommodate the free exercise of religion from those that provide unjustifiable 
awards of assistance to religious  organization^."^^ Therefore, O'Connor determines that the 
endorsement of religion is not the same as accommodation of religion. O'Connor argues that 
even if the government action can be characterized as "allowing" religious organizations to 
advance religion, it will be upheld so long as government action itself does not directly advance 
religion.79 According to O'Connor, special treatment in this case is intended to protect religious 
liberty (in this case, a church's hiring process) from government regulation. 
In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, O'Connor attempts to differentiate 
between accommodation and "unjustifiable awards of assistance" to religion. She begins by 
saying that a law must be generally applicable, meaning that it is nondiscriminatory and 
impartial toward religion. It must treat all groups, religious and nonreligious, equally. Because 
of this notion, O'Connor argues that government classifications based on religion must be strictly 
scrutinized to ensure that the government is not directly favoring or disfavoring of religion or a 
particular religious belief. O'Connor writes, "What makes accommodation permissible, even 
praiseworthy, is not that the government is making life easier for some particular religious group 
as such. Rather, it is that the government is accommodating a deeply held belief." She 
continues, "Accommodations may thus justify heating those who share this belief differently 
from those who do not; but they do not justify discriminations based on sect."80 Therefore, 
O'Connor believes that accommodations are permissible when it is protecting religious liberty 
and not directly advancing or endorsing re~igion.~' 
l8  Id. -- 
79 Id. 
Board ofEducation ofKiq~us Joel v. Grumet, 512 U .S .  687,716 (1994) (I. O'Connor, concurring). 
" Id., 714. 
Another establishment clause issue that O'Connor addresses is whether the aid to religion 
is coming primarily from the government or from private persons or groups. Board ofEducation 
v. Mergens, which involved a school administration at a high school that denied permission to a 
group of students to form a Christian club with the same privileges and meeting terms as other 
after-school student clubs, involved this issue. The case addressed the question of whether the 
school's prohibition against the formation of a Christian club consistent with the establishment 
clause rendered the Equal Access Act unconstitutional. The Equal Access Act requires that 
schools in receipt with federal funds provide "equal access" to student groups seeking to express 
messages of "religious, political, philosophical, or other ~ontent." '~ O'Connor agreed with the 
majority of the Court that the school, in distinguishing between "curriculum" and 
"noncurriculum student groups," was prohibited from denying equal access to any after-school 
club based on the content of its speech.83 A noncurriculum student group refers to any student 
group that does not directly relate to the body of courses offered by the school. A curriculum 
group, on the other hand, means any student group that directly relates to a school's curriculum if 
the subject matter of the group is actually taught, or will soon be taught, in a regularly offered 
course. In addition, a curriculum group may also include any student group whose subject 
matter concerns the body of courses as a whole, if participation in the group is required for a 
particular course, or if participation results in academic credit.84 
In her opinion, O'Connor concludes that an open-forum policy including 
nondiscrimination against religious speech would have a secular purpose.85 Since the Equal 
Access Act also prohibits discrimination on the basis of "political, philosophical, or other" 
82 Boord ofEducalion of Westside Comm~rnify School v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,236 (1990) (J. O'Connor. 
concurring). 
" Id., 241. 
84 Id. 
85 Id., 249. 
speech as well as religious speech, it too has a secular purpose. If a State refused lo let religious 
groups use facilities open to others, then it would send a message of government disapproval of 
religion. O'Connor argues that because student speech is permitted on a nondiscriminatory 
basis, the students are mature enough to understand that the school does not endorse or support 
the permitted student speech.86 In addition, the school administration, since it has control over 
any impressions it gives its students, also has control over the extent to which it makes clear that 
its recognition of the club is not equivalent with an endorsement of the views of the club's 
participants.87 O'Connor determines that because the school permits student speech on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, it is enough to prevent private aid to religion on the part of the school 
from becoming government aid that violates the establishment clause. 
It can he concluded that O'Connor believes that the establishment clause prohibits laws 
that directly or primarily advance religion in general or a particular religion. Therefore, she 
believes that nondiscriminatory, indirect aid to religion in general or all religions equally is 
constitutional. O'Connor upholds aid to religion in general so long as it is indirect or secondary 
in nature. 
C. O'Connor 's Interpretation ofthe Free Exercise Clause 
Justice O'Connor's belief that accommodations are permissible, when not directly 
advancing or endorsing religion, is based on her fiee exercise clause jurisprudence, which is 
related to the major issue of whether the free exercise clause guarantees a right to religion-based 
exemptions from valid, secular laws. O'Connor writes, "The Free Exercise Clause is properly 
understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious activities without 
impermissible governmental interference, even where a believer's conduct is in tension with a 
86 Id., 25 1. 
87 Id., 252. 
law of general application."88 She believes that the First Amendment does not distinguish 
between laws that target a religious practice and laws that only indirectly and unintentionally 
restrict or burden a religious practice.89 She explains, "If the First Amendment is to have any 
vitality, it ought not be construed to cover only the extreme and hypothetical situation in which a 
State directly targets a religious practice."90 Therefore, O'Connor believes that even indirect 
harm to religion should be prohibited as much as possible on the basis of the free exercise clause. 
Since O'Connor believes that the free exercise clause, at least under certain 
circumstances, does guarantee a right to religion-based exemptions from generally, applicable 
laws, she must have some kind of standard or test for determining what those circumstances are. 
She contends that in order to deny a free exercise claim, the government must show that the law 
serves a compelling state interest. O'Connor writes, "Only an especially important governmental 
interest pursued by narrowly tailored means can justify exacting a sacrifice of First Amendment 
freedoms as the price for an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other 
citi~ens."~' O'Connor states that the compelling interest test is closely related to the First 
Amendment's guarantee of religious liberty, its preferred position, and its requirement "that the 
Court will not permit encroachments upon this liberty, whether direct or indirect, unless required 
by clear and compelling governmental interests 'of the highest order."'92 Therefore, O'Connor 
concludes that the government must show that an "unusually important" government interest is 
Cify ofBoerne~  v.  Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 565 (1997) (J. O'Connor, dissenting). 
89 Enrployment Division of Oregon v. Smith, 494 US. 872, 895 (1990) (1. O'Connor, concurring). 
Id. 
91 Bowen v.  Roy, 476 U.S. 693,729 (1986) (1. O'Connor, concurring). 
92 Employn~ent Division of Oregon v .  Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 896 (1990) (J. O'Connor, concurring). 
at stake and that the resulting burden is the "least restrictive means" to obtain or protect the 
government's interest.93 
O'Connor clearly applies the compelling state interest test in Employment Division of 
Oregon v. Smith, which dealt with the question of whether Oregon's criminal prohibition on 
peyote use prohibited two Native Americans' ability to freely exercise their religion.94 Two 
Native Americans worked as counselors for a private drug rehabilitation organization and 
ingested peyote as part of their religious ceremonies. As a result, the dmg rehabilitation 
organization fired the counselors, who then filed for unemployment compensation.95 O'Connor 
clearly summarizes the main issue of the case when she writes, "Thus, the critical question in this 
case is whether exempting respondents from the State's general criminal prohibition 'will unduly 
interfere with fulfillment of the governmental in te re~ t . " '~~  She concludes that the state's interest 
in the uniform application of Oregon's criminal prohibition on peyote use is sufficient to 
override the use of peyote for religious purposes. O'Connor argues that if an exemption were 
granted in this case, it would severely limit Oregon's ability to prohibit the possession of peyote 
by its  citizen^.^' She also determines that such a prohibition is the least restrictive means to 
address the government's interest. O'Connor writes, "Oregon's criminal prohibition represents 
that State's judgment that the possession and use of controlled substances, even by only one 
person, is inherently harmful and dangerous."98 However, she does recognize that, "other 
governments may surely choose to grant an exemption without Oregon, with its specific asserted 
interest in uniform application of its drug laws, being required to do so by the First 
93 Spreng, Jennifer. "Failing Honorably: Balancing Tests, Justice O'Connor and Free Exercise of Religion." Saint 
Louis Universify Law Jot~rnal: Spring, 1994, 862. 
94Employment Division ofOregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 892 (1990) (J. O'Connor, concurring). 
95  id^ 
96 Id., 906. 
97 Id., 907. 
98 Id., 906. 
~ m e n d m e n t . " ~ ~  According to O'Connor, the use of the compelling state interest test under these 
specific circumstances resulting in the ruling that the free exercise clause did not require the state 
to accommodate these two individuals' religiously motivated conduct. 
O'Connor discusses the application of the compelling state interest test in Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association. Lyng involved the harvesting of timber and 
the construction of a 75-mile road between two California towns through an area that had been 
historically used by members of three Indian tribes. The Indian tribes used this area to conduct a 
wide variety of specific religious rituals for the purpose of personal spiritual development. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court had to address the question of whether timber harvesting and the 
construction of the road through an area of religious significance to the Indians violated the free 
exercise clause.100 She writes, "The Government does not dispute, and we have no reason to 
doubt, that the logging and road-building projects at issue in this case could have devastating 
effects on traditional Indian religious practices."'0' O'Connor also acknowledges the fact that 
the rituals would be ineffective if conducted at other sites. In addition, she also believes that too 
much disturbance surrounding the area used for rituals would result in a discontinuation of 
religious pra~tices."~ 
In utilizing a con~pelling state interest test, O'Connor relies on a distinction between 
coercive burdens and purely incidental burdens. In her majority opinion in Lyng v. Northwest 
Indian Cemetery Protective Association, O'Connor argues that laws with the tendency to coerce 
"Id., 907. 
loo Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S .  439 (1988) (J. O'Connor, majority). 
lo' Id., 452. 
'OZ Id. 
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs require a religion-based exemption.lo3 
She writes, 
"The building of a road or the harvesting of timber on publicly owned land cannot meaning be 
distinguished from the use of a Social Security number in Roy. In both cases, the challenged 
Government action would interfere significantly with private persons' ability to pursue spiritual 
fulfillment according to their own religious beliefs. In neither case, however, would the affected 
individuals be coerced by the Government's action into violating their religious beliefs; nor would 
either governmental action penalize the religious activity by denying any person an equal share of 
the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other  citizen^."'^^ 
Since O'Connor concludes that the harvesting of timber on publicly owned land does not deny 
any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens, she 
characterizes it as a non-coercive, or incidental. The burden that arises from such activity is not 
coercive and therefore, not prohibited by the free exercise clause. O'Comor believes that the 
compelling state interest test should be used only when a law indirectly or directly coerces 
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs. It can be concluded that when a law 
directly or indirectly threatens the free exercise of religion through coercion, O'Connor uses a 
compelling state interest test to determine whether the personlgroup whose free exercise of 
religion is threatened by the law should be exempt from having to obey the law. 
D. O'Connor on How to Resolve the Tension between the Two Clauses 
O'Comor acknowledges that an inherent tension exists between the establishment clause 
and the free exercise clause. She writes, "It is obvious that either of the two Religion Clauses, 'if 
expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other. ,,,I05 She argues that the 
Court's call for government neutrality toward religion has exacerbated the conflict because it 
would be difficult to reconcile "complete neutrality" with the necessity to sometimes exempt a 
'O Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439,449 (1988) (O'Connor, majority). 
'04 Id. -- 
105 Wallace v Jaffiee, 472 U S .  38, 83 (1985) (J. O'Connor, concurring). 
religious observer from an otherwise generally applicable law.'06 O'Connor writes, "The 
solution to the conflict between the Religion Clauses lies not in 'neutrality,' but rather in 
identifying workable limits to the government's license to promote the free exercise of 
religion."'07 Since O'Connor believes that the free exercise clause, in some cases, requires the 
government to lift a burden on the free exercise of religion, she acknowledges that the standard 
establishment clause mandate test should be modified accordingly. Although a law 
"accommodating" religion is inherently not neutral toward religion, O'Connor believes that it 
can still be okay if it is protecting religious liberty and not directly advancing or endorsing 
religion. Therefore, even though O'Connor is committed to neutrality between religion and 
irreligion, as well as between particular religions, she reconciles her concept of neutrality with 
the need to protect religious liberty in certain circumstances, so long as it does not directly 
advance or endorse religion. 
1V. Rehnquist and 0 'Connor 
A. A Comparison oftheir Interpretation of the Religion Clauses 
O'Connor and Rehnquist agree that the religion clauses should be interpreted on the basis 
of their original meaning. However, they differ in their consistency in adhering to such a 
principle. Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree and O'Connor's concurring 
opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree both exhibit a reliance on history to obtain the meaning of the 
establishment clause. Rehnquist, however, has a more consistent legal philosophy based upon an 
original understanding of the clauses. He believes that the true meaning of the establishment 
clause can only be seen in its history and argues that if a constitutional theory has no basis in the 
I06 Id. 
107 Id.. 84. 
history of the amendment it seeks to interpret, it is difficult to apply because it yields 
unprincipled results.108 
Although O'Connor's opinion uses historical evidence such as the existence of state 
constitutional provisions, the practice of early colonies and early states in regards to religion, and 
the writing of early leaders who helped to shape our Nation, her approach remains inconsistent. 
Rather, she approaches each case individually in order to arrive at a practical conclusion. This is 
exhibited in her Grumet opinion, in which she fails to adhere to a single test under the 
establishment clause.109 If there is no single test for deciding establishment clause cases, then 
this implies that there is no single interpretation of the clause. Rehnquist, however, stresses that 
the historical evidence should be correctly interpreted so as to yield consistent, principled results 
in religion clauses cases. 
Not only do Rehnquist and O'Connor differ in their consistency in using an original 
understanding approach, but they hold different positions on the incorporation of the religion 
clauses into the Fourteenth Amendment. Although both have accepted it, Rehnquist has 
accepted it grudgingly and questioningly. Because the religion clauses originally were only 
intended to apply to the federal government, Rehnquist has acknowledged that he is not sure how 
the clauses should be interpreted when applied to the states. O'Connor, on the other hand, uses 
history to affirm the view that religious freedom is so fundamental that it is appropriate for the 
Court to apply it to the states via the due process clause ofthe fourteenth amendment.l1° The 
acknowledgement that the Court has guaranteed religious freedom by protecting citizens from 
religious incursions by the States as well as by the Federal Government suggests her acceptance 
of the incorporation of the religion clauses into the Fourteenth Amendment. 
la' Wallace v. Jafiee,  472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (1. Rehnquist, dissenting). 
'09 Board ofEducation ofKiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,719 (1994) (1. O'Connor, concurring) 
110 McCreary Counfy v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844,883,  (2005) (1. O'Connor, concurring). 
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B. What is "Religion "? 
Another issue that Rehnquist and O'Connor both address is the meaning of the word 
"religion" in the First Amendment; however, Rehnquist addresses it at greater length than does 
O'Connor. Rehnquist's distinction between religion and personal philosophical choice in 
Thomas v. Review Board serves to illustrate that the First Amendment draws a line between the 
two."' O'Connor however, in Board ofEducation ofKiiyas Joel I? Grumet, fails to differentiate 
between religion and what she calls a deeply held belief.l12 As a result, she fails to differentiate 
between religion and personal philosophical choice like Rehnquist does. 
Both justices do, however, vaguely address what constitutes religion in Elk Grove UniJied 
School District v. Newdow. In Newdow, O'Connor differentiates between religion and 
ceremonial deism. She acknowledges that in some instances, the government is allowed to refer 
to or commemorate religion in public life. This is because although such references use 
language pertaining to religious belief, they are more properly understood as having a secular 
purpose, which in this case is acknowledging the role religion has played in our nation's 
history."' Rehnquist offers an analysis similar to that of O'Connor, distinguishing between 
religion and its historical role in American history and tradition. Like O'Connor, he believes that 
the phrase 'under God' has a patriotic, secular purpose, thus distinguishing between religion and 
the role it has played in our nation's h i~tory ."~ 
C. The Establishment Clause 
Justice Rehnquist and O'Connor also agree on the fact that the establishment and free 
exercise clauses have different meanings. O'Connor's ~osi t ion on the difference between the 
'I' Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 724 (1981) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting). 
' I 2  Board ofEduca!ion ofKiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,716 (1994). (J. O'Connor, concurring). 
' I 3  Elk Grove UnijedSchool District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. l , 3 6  (2004) (J. O'Connor, concurring). 
' I '  Id., 27 (J. Rehnquist, concurring). 
two clauses is most clearly shown in her concurring opinion in Counw ofAllegheny v. ACLU 
She explains that while proof of coercion provides a basis for a claim under the Free Exercise 
Clause, it is not a necessary element of any claim under the establishment c l a u ~ e . " ~  Merely 
showing favoritism to particular beliefs or religion in general is enough to provide the basis for a 
claim under the establishment clause. As a result. O'Connor relies on the endorsement test. She 
argues that if a statute's primary purpose or effect is a message of government endorsement or 
disapproval of religion, it violates the establishment clause. O'Connor's endorsement test 
requires neutrality between religion and irreligion, as well as among particular religions. 
Rehnquist's interpretation of the establishment clause also relies on a concept of neutrality; 
however, he believes that the government must be neutral only among particular sects and not 
between religion and irreligion. 
Thus, the major difference between O'Connor's and Rehnquist's interpretation of the 
establishment clause deals with whom the government should be neutral toward. O'Connor 
argues that the government must be neutral toward all different religions and toward religion and 
irreligion. Rehnquist, on the other hand, believes that the government must be neutral toward 
different religions but does not have to be neutral toward religion and irreligion. Although both 
justices differ on whom the government can not aid, they agree on what kind of aid is prohibited 
by the establishment clause. Rehnquist and O'Connor both agree that direct aid is prohibited 
while indirect, nondiscriminatory aid is permitted under the establishment clause. 
Because Rehnquist and O'Connor agree on what kind of aid is prohibited by the 
establishment clause, they maintain the same position regarding whether the establishment clause 
prohibits laws accommodating the exercise or practice of religion. Rehnquist agrees with 
115 Counly ofAllegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,629, (1989) 
(I. O'Connor, concurring). 
O'Connor that accommodation is permissible. According to O'Connor, accommodations justify 
treating those who share a religious belief differently from those who do not. They do not, 
however, justify discriminations based on sect.'16 Rehnquist agrees with O'Connor because he 
believes that the establishment clause does not require the govemment to be neutral between 
religion and irreligion, but only among particular religions. 
Although O'Connor and Rehnquist share the same position regarding accommodations, 
they disagree over the point at which private aid to or endorsement of religion or a particular 
religion becomes government aidendorsement that violates the establishment clause. In the 
Santa Fe case, which involved a high school student's delivery of an "invocation andor 
message" before home varsity football games, Rehnquist explains that the existence of the 
election allows student campaigns to focus on whatever they choose; if student campaigning did 
begin to focus on prayer, the school could implement the necessary restrictions."' In this case, 
Rehnquist determined that the aid to religion was coming primarily from private individuals and 
not the government. O'Connor, however, voted exactly the opposite from Rehnquist in the 
Santa Fe case, which implies that she did not view the election as a sufficient step to ensure an 
absence of govemment endorsement. 
D. The Free Exercise Clause 
When a law directly threatens the free exercise of religion, the issue is whether the law 
itself is constitutional. When a law indirectly harms religion, the issue is not whether the law is 
constitutional, but whether the persodgroup whose free exercise of religion is threatened by the 
law should be exempt from having to obey the law. However, because Rehnquist believes that 
indirect, unintended harm to religion is permissible, he does not favor granting religion-based 
' . " ~ o o r d u j , j W z ~ r a ~ i u n  u f K i ~ ) ~ . s  Jus11. Grilrnsl 512 (1,s. 687, 716 (1994) (1. O'Connor, concurring). 
' 7  Smro Fe IndepenJenl Schuul Di~rricr 1 .  Due, 530 [ I S .  290.82 1 (2000) (1. Kehnquist, dissentins). 
exemptions from generally applicable laws. However, O'Connor does. She believes that laws 
with the tendency to coerce individuals of a religious group, whether directly or indirectly, into 
acting contrary to their religious beliefs are unconstitutional unless the state can show reason for 
the coercion. O'Connor, therefore, has a broader interpretation of the free exercise clause than 
Rehnquist does. 
O'Connor argues that in order for the government to restrict religiously motivated 
conduct, it must exhibit a compelling state interest. Therefore, the government must justify any 
substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."' Rehnquist, however, does not employ such a test. 
Rather, he relies upon a distinction between direct and indirect harm. His dissent in Thomas 
clearly indicates that if state governments pass valid, generally applicable laws prohibiting 
conduct that conflicts with a citizen's belief or conduct, then the government regulation will 
prevail. As a result, Rehnquist does not believe that the free exercise clause guarantees a right to 
religion-based exemptions from valid, secular laws that are generally applicable. In Thomas, he 
argues that a State is not constitutionally required to grant exemptions to religious persons from 
state unemployment regulations."9 He determined that Thomas was not singled out in this case 
and, therefore, that there was no reason for the Court to now single him out for special 
exemption. 
E. Tension between the Clauses 
Rehnquist and O'Connor both recognize the tension that exists between the establishment 
clause and the free exercise clause. Rehnquist believes that the conflict between the two clauses 
has been exacerbated by the Court. He argues that a "tension' exists between the free exercise 
118 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.  872, 895 (1990) (1. O'Connor, dissenting). 
119 Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S .  707,724 (1981) (1. Rehnquist, dissenting). 
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clause and the establishment clause of the United States Constitution, but that it is largely of the 
Court's making, so much so that it would almost completely diminish if the clauses were 
properly interpreted.120 In order to diminish the tension, Rehnquist calls for the principle of 
benevolent neutrality. For Rehnquist, the natural corollary to the permissible accommodation of 
religion under the establishment clause is the permissible restriction on the free exercise of 
religion.12' 
In his dissent in Thomas v. Review Board, Rehnquist writes, "If the Court were to 
construe the Free Exercise Clause as it did in Braunfeld and the Establishment Clause as Justice 
Stewart did in Schempp, the circumstances in which there would be a conflict between the two 
Clauses would be few and far between."'22 This suggests that he views Braunfeld as a correct 
reading of the Free Exercise Clause and Justice Stewart's opinion in Schemnpp as a proper 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. The two plaintiffs in Braunfeld were members of the 
Orthodox Jewish faith, which required them to close their places of business from nightfall each 
Friday until nightfall each Saturday. They alleged that a Sunday closing law would result in an 
impairment of their ability to earn a living.lZ3 Rehnquist explains that Braunzld did not make 
the religious practices of appellants unlawful but simply made the practice of their religious 
beliefs more expensive.'24 This explanation supports Rehnquist's view that the free exercise 
clause does not guarantee religious exemptions from valid, secular laws that are generally 
applicable. He determined that indirect harm, in this case a Sunday closing law, is permitted 
under the free exercise clause. 
I2O Id., 723. 
I21 Davis 150. 
I22 Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 728 (1981) (I. Rehnquist, dissenting). 
123 Braunfeldv. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, (1961). 
12' Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707,723 (1981) (I. Rehnquist, dissenting). 
Rebnquist also cites Justice Stewart's dissent in Schempp to support his view that the 
establishment clause is currently interpreted too broadly by the court. He writes, "He explained 
that the Establishment Clause is limited to "government support of proselytizing activities of 
religious sects by throwing the weight of secular [authorities] behind the dissemination of 
religious tenets."I2' This means that the establishment clause is not violated by laws with a 
primarily secular purpose and effect that secondarily or indirectly aids religion. Since this belief 
underlines his interpretation of both the free exercise clause and establishment clause, it can be 
concluded that Rebnquist adheres to a principle of benevolent neutrality. 
On the other hand, O'Connor recognizes the tension but does not believe that the two 
clauses will necessarily conflict. She argues that the challenge lies in establishing proper 
establishment clause limits on voluntary government efforts to facilitate the free exercise of 
1 e 1 i ~ i o n . l ~ ~  O'Connor believes that the conflict between the two clauses can be avoided on the 
basis of religious liberty. O'Connor clearly addresses this issue in Wallace v. Jaffree. She 
argues, "The solution to the conflict between the Religion Clauses lies not in 'neutrality,' but 
rather in identifying workable limits to the government's license to promote the free exercise of 
religion. The text of the Free Exercise Clause speaks of laws that prohibit the free exercise of 
religion. On its face, the Clause is directed at government interference with free exercise. Given 
that concern, one can plausibly assert that government pursues Free Exercise Clause values when 
it lifts a government-imposed burden on the free exercise of religion. If a statute falls within this 
category, then the standard Establishment Clause test should be modified accordingly."'27 She 
argues that in situations in which the government may grant religion-based exemptions from 
valid, secular laws, individual perceptions of government endorsement may not matter. 
12' Id.. 726, 
12' Wallace Y. JafjLee. 472 U.S. 38,83 (1985) ( J .  O'Connor, concurring). 
12' Id., 84. 
O'Connor assumes that an objective observer would understand the values promoted by the free 
exercise clause and therefore, any other perceptions should be ignored. Whereas O'Connor 
stresses religious liberty, Rehnquist emphasizes a principle of benevolent neutrality as a basis for 
his religion clause jurisprudence. 
F. Rehnquist and O'Connor: A Final Comparison 
Although Rehnquist and O'Connor differ on whom the establishment clause should be 
neutral toward, they agree on what kind of aid is prohibited by the establishment clause. 
Rehnquist believes that the establishment clause only requires neutrality among particular 
religions and not between religion and irreligion. O'Connor, on the other hand, argues that the 
establishment clause requires neutrality between religion and irreligion, in addition to particular 
religions. Both justices believe, however, that the establishment clause prohibits direct aid. In 
addition. each justice argues that indirect or secondary aid to religion in general or any particular 
religion is not prohibited by the establishment clause. 
Regarding the free exercise clause, each justice holds a different position on whether the 
free exercise clause guarantees a right to religion-based exemptions from valid, secular laws that 
are generally applicable. Whereas O'Connor believes that the free exercise clause does 
guarantee such a right, Rehnquist does not. Since O'Connor believes in the right to exempt a 
religious observer from a generally applicable law, she utilizes a compelling state interest test in 
cases of government coercion, whether directly or indirectly, to determine exactly when such an 
exemption is permissible. To withhold an exemption, the government must show that an 
'unusually important' government interest is at stake and that the resulting burden is the 'least 
restrictive means' to address the government's interest. Rehnquist, on the other hand, does not 
employ such a test. Rather, he relies on a distinction upon direct and indirect harm. He 
maintains that all indirect, nondiscriminatory harm is allowed under the free exercise clause, 
while direct harm is prohibited. 
The set of differences between O'Connor and Rehnquist can be attributed to the large 
emphasis O'Connor places on religious liberty. She stresses the importance the founders placed 
on preserving religious liberty and has applied that to reconciling the two clauses. Rehnquist, 
however, relies not upon religious liberty to resolve the tension between the two clauses but on a 
principle of benevolent neutrality. Once again, Rehnquist's belief that the establishment clause 
does not require neutrality between religion and non-religion, but only neutrality between 
particular sects, highlights such a principle. 
The discrepancies between O'Connor's and Rehnquist's interpretation of the religion 
clauses show that the question of how religious beliefs and practices should be treated by the 
government remains at the forefront of constitutional debate. It has, in fact, become even more 
controversial over time as the Supreme Court's interpretation has remained unclear and 
inconsistent. Therefore, numerous questions remain to be answered regarding which justice's 
interpretation of the religion clauses is most persuasive and whether it ought to be adopted by the 
Court, including its newest members. 
V. Rehnquist and O'Connor: A Critical Analysis 
The crucial issues are whether Rehnquist and O'Connor have a workable standard for 
distinguishing between aid or harm that is constitutional and that which is not constitutional and 
whether one justice is more consistent than the other in the application of their standard. 
Rehnquist and O'Connor disagree on a number of issues: the extent to which the religion clauses 
should be interpreted on the basis of their original meaning, the meanings of the two clauses, 
whom the government should be neutral toward, whether the free exercise clause guarantees 
religion-based exemptions from generally applicable laws, whether the meanings of the two 
clauses conflict, and how to reconcile the two clauses. The differences between Rehnquist and 
O'Connor's interpretation of the establishment clause and free exercise clause show how 
difficult it has been for the Court to establish a clear, consistent, and practical interpretation of 
the religion clauses. Both interpretations, however, cannot be correct. I will argue that Justice 
Rehnquist's interpretation of the religion clauses is preferable to that of O'Connor and ought to 
be adopted by the Court, including its newest members 
Although both Rehnquist and O'Connor use an original understanding approach in their 
interpretation of the religion clauses, Rehnquist uses his approach more consistently. As a result, 
his overall legal philosophy is much more uniform than that of O'Connor, whose original 
understanding approach is applied inconsistently. Although O'Connor discusses the existence of 
state constitutional provisions, the practice of colonies and early states in regards to religion, and 
the writing of early leaders who helped to shape our Nation in order to establish the meaning of 
the establishment clause in Wallace, her application of the establishment clause remains 
inconsistent because she approaches each case individually, as in Grumet, to arrive at a practical 
conclusion. Her failure to adhere to a single test for deciding establishment clause cases 
represents a major weakness in her analysis, which suggests inconsistencies in her original 
understanding approach. 
Whereas O'Connor fluctuates in her application of a single standard under the 
establishment clause, Rehnquist does not. He argues that historical evidence should be 
interpreted correctly so that the true meaning of the establishment clause can be 
Since Rehnquist believes that the establishment clause acquired a well-accepted meaning from 
the history surrounding the adoption of the religion clauses, he believes that the establishment 
128 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U .S .  38, 113 (1985) (1. Rehnquist, dissenting) 
clause prohibits the establishment of a national religion and preference among religious sects or 
denominations and thus, applies this to every establishment clause case. O'Connor, on the other 
hand, suggests that there are different categories of establishment clause cases, which may call 
for different appro ache^.'^^ O'Connor, in using an original understanding approach clearly 
articulated in Wallace, still fails to adopt a single standard of analysis under the establishment 
clause, suggesting a weakness that is inherent in her inconsistent use of original understanding. 
In addition to a difference in consistently using an original understanding approach, each 
justice holds a different position on whom the government should be neutral towards. Although 
both judges allow some aid under the establishment clause, they use a different standard to 
determine what is and is not allowed. O'Connor relies on the concept of neutrality between 
religion and irreligion, as well as among particular religions. Rehnquist, on the other hand, 
believes that the First Amendment was understood to prohibit only preferential support for 
certain religions over others.'30 Therefore, he believes that the establishment clause prohibits 
only laws that advance one or some religions, but not all religions. Laws that advance religion in 
general or all religions equally are not prohibited. O'Connor and Rehnquist use a different 
standard of neutrality to distinguish between aid that is constitutional and that which is not 
constitutional according to their original understanding approach. 
Related to their respective concepts of neutrality, Rehnquist offers a distinction between 
religion and personal philosophical choice that O'Connor does not. In Thomas v. Review Board, 
Rehnquist discusses the implications that arise from defining Thomas' belief as a 'personal 
philosophical choice,' as opposed to a religious belief.I3' The main issue was whether Thomas' 
decision to voluntarily terminate his employment was more a personal philosophical choice than 
129 Board ofEducation of Kiryas Joel v. Grtrmer, 5 I2 U.S. 687,716 (1994) (1. O'Connor, concurring), 
"O Id., 93. 
"' Thomos v. Review' Board, 450 U.S. 707, 724 (1981) (I. Rehnquist, dissenting). 
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a religious belief. The Court had to ask and answer this question in order to determine whether 
any burden placed on the employee's right to free exercise of his religion was justified by 
legitimate state  interest^.'^^ The Indiana Supreme Court had determined the precise nature of 
Thomas' belief to be unclear. As a result, it concluded that the belief was more 'personal 
philosophical choice' than religious belief. Rehnquist argues that the Supreme Court's failure to 
take a position on this issue led to a major problem. He suggests that if a distinction is not made 
between religion and personal philosophical choice, individuals will be able to quit their jobs, 
assert that they did so for personal reasons, and collect unemployment Rehnquist 
argues that this would open the way for all kinds of persons to get exemptions from all kinds of 
laws. 
O'Connor, however, does not offer a distinction between religion and other beliefs, such 
as personal philosophical choices. This represents another major weakness in her approach. 
Although she argues that government classifications based on religion must be strictly 
scrutinized to ensure that the government is not directly favoring or disfavoring of religion, she 
uses the term "deeply held beliet' rather than religious belief. The fact that she is talking about 
accommodations for religious groups is clear. However, her distinction between a religious 
group and an individual holding a deeply held belief raises the question of whether O'Connor is 
saying that accommodations should not be given just to deeply held, religious beliefs, but should 
be given to all deeply held beliefs, religious or not. She states, "A draft law may exempt 
conscientious objectors, but it may not exempt conscientious objectors whose objections are 
based on theistic belief (such as Quakers) as opposed to nontheistic belief (such as Buddhists) or 
13' Id, 
'33 Id. 
atheistic belief.'34 O'Connor's approach leaves room open for interpretation because it is unclear 
and inconsistent. Her argument that a conscientious objector whose objections are based on 
atheistic belief may be exempt from a generally, applicable law that most persons have to obey 
seems to contradict her interpretation of the free exercise clause, which will be discussed later. 
Another failure is O'Connor's inability to adhere to a single test under the establishment 
clause. If there is no single test for deciding establishment clause cases, then this implies that 
there is no single interpretation of the clause. In her Grumet opinion, O'Connor even says that 
her endorsement test is not the only test that should be used.'j5 This leads her to conclude that 
"Experience proves that the Establishment Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, cannot easily be 
reduced to a single test. There are different categories of Establishment Clause cases, which may 
call for different approaches."136 She discusses four different categories of establishment clause 
cases and says that different tests should be used for each of them. O'Connor differentiates 
between cases that involve government action targeted at particular individuals, cases involving 
government speech on religious topics, cases in which the government must make decisions 
about matters of religious doctrine and religious law, and cases involving government 
delegations of power to religious bodies.137 Her argument that the establishment clause cannot 
be reduced to a single, unitary test represents a major weakness in her approach. Because 
O'Connor argues that different tests should be used for four different categories of establishment 
clause cases, this opinion suggests that she prefers a case-specific, pragmatic approach rather 
then one single test for the establishment clause. This is inconsistent with the clear application 
Ij4 Board ofEducation ofKiryas Joelv. Grumet, 512 U.S.  687,717 (1994) (I. O'Connor, concurring). 
"I Id.. 720. 
'36 Id., 721 
137 Id. 
of the endorsement test in cases such as Mitchell v. Helms, Lynch v. Donnelly, and Rosenberger 
v. 1Jniversity of Viriginia. 
O'Connor's Grumet opinion also raises numerous questions about accommodation.'3s 
She starts out as if she is completely committed to the concept of neutrality. O'Connor writes, 
"Religious needs can be accommodated through laws that are neutral with regard to religion."'39 
Not only does she call for neutrality among religions but between religion and irreligion. In 
addition, O'Connor gives examples of laws that are acceptable because the accommodations they 
give are given to non-religious persons (atheists) as well as religious persons. One of her main 
arguments in Grumet is that what makes accommodation permissible, even praiseworthy, is that 
the government is not making life easier for some particular religious group but that it is 
accommodating a deeply held belief. This raises an important question: is she saying that the 
only kind of accommodations (exemptions) that may be given are those that are necessary to 
prevent individuals from having to act in a way that is inconsistent with a deeply held belief? If 
so, this could mean that most religious institutions, like churches, could never qualify for 
accommodations or exemptions because they cannot have deeply held beliefs. O'Connor may 
just mean that there are many kinds of religious "exercises" that could not be accommodated by 
the government because they are not required by a deeply held belief. However, her explanation 
remains unclear and needs to be further clarified in order to answer the question of whether the 
only kind of accommodations (exemptions) that may be given are those that are necessary to 
prevent individuals from having to act in a way that is inconsistent with a deeply held belief. 
O'Connor's argument in Amos, however, contradicts her argument in Grumet that what 
makes accommodation permissible, even praiseworthy, is not that the government is making life 
Id. 
139 Id.. 718 
easier for some particular religious group as such but rather, that it is accommodating a deeply 
held belief.l4' By providing an exemption to a religious organization from a generally applicable 
regulatory burden that did not threaten a deeply held belief, she contradicts her statement in 
Grumel that accommodations are needed to protect deeply held beliefs and, thus, the individuals 
who hold them. In Amos, she explains that "in order to perceive the government action as a 
permissible accommodation of religion, there must in fact be an identifiable burden on the 
exercise of religion that can be said to be lifted by the government action."'41 Whereas Grumet 
addresses accommodations in relation to a deeply held belief, O'Connor argues in Amos that 
accommodations may be related to the exercise of religion in general. What she fails to address 
is a connection between the two when discussing accommodations. For example, does the 
exercise of religion in general necessarily have to be related to a deeply held belief? In Amos, 
O'Connor determined that the church had a right to hire and fire employees on the basis of 
religion even though this did not threaten a deeply held belief. This point needs to be clarified if 
O'Connor is to offer a consistent application of the establishment clause in relation to 
accommodations. 
Whereas O'Connor's Grumet opinion raises numerous questions about the consistency of 
her interpretation of the establishment clause, Rehnquist's establishment clause jurisprudence is 
much more clear and consistent. His opinions, including Van Orden v. Periy, Stone v. Graham, 
Mueller v. Allen, and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe all adhere to his establishment 
clause standard, which allows government aid to particular religions so long as the aid is 
secondary andlor indirect. In other words, so long as the primary purpose and effect of a law is 
secular in nature, then it does not matter to Rehnquist if a particular religion benefits indirectly or 
14' Corporalion ofpresiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (1. O'Connor, concurring). 
14' Id., 349. 
secondarily from the law. Rehnquist's method is preferable to that of O'Connor because he 
shows it is able to be applied consistently, whereas O'Connor's standard is not. 
Rehnquist also offers a more uniform interpretation of the free exercise clause than 
O'Connor. The main issue over which the justices differ is whether the clause guarantees a right 
to religion-based exemptions from general laws that most persons have to obey. Rehnquist relies 
on a distinction between direct and indirect harm, while O'Connor relies upon a compelling state 
interest test in both cases, so long as coercion is present. 
In deciding when to use the compelling state interest test, O'Connor fails to offer a clear 
distinction between what she terms coercive burdens and incidental burdens upon religion. Since 
O'Connor does believe that the free exercise clause guarantees a right to religion-based 
exemptions, she utilizes a compelling interest analysis. Laws with the tendency to coerce 
individuals, whether directly or indirectly, into acting contrary to their religious beliefs require a 
religion-based exemption unless the government can show that an "unusually important" 
government interest is at stake and that the resulting burden on the exercise of religion is the 
"least restrictive means" to attain the government's interest.'42 In determining when to use the 
compelling state interest test, O'Connor distinguishes between coercive burdens and purely 
incidental burdens. 
It is difficult to understand, under O'Connor's approach, when coercion is involved 
because of her reasoning in Lyng and her reasoning in Smith and thus, when to use the 
compelling state interest test. Although O'Connor utilizes the test in Smith because she 
recognizes that peyote is a sacrament of the Native American Church and is regarded as vital to 
their ability to practice their religion, she does not use the same test in Lyng. She acknowledges 
in Lyng that the rituals would be ineffective at other sites and that too much disturbance 
'" Spreng 862. 
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surrounding the area used for rituals would result in a discontinuation of religious practices, yet 
does not use the compelling state interest test. She determines that no coercion is present even 
though the log-rolling and road-building projects would have severe adverse effects on the 
practice of the Native Americans' religion. This highlights an inconsistency in the coercion 
standard used by O'Connor to determine in which circumstances the use of the compelling 
interest test is justifiable. 
Rehnquist, on the other hand, offers a clear approach in deciding free exercise cases. He 
relies on a distinction between direct and indirect harm to religion. In Thomas v. Review Board 
of Indiana Employment Security Division, Rehnquist found no violation of the free exercise 
clause because the state of Indiana, in the interest of Iegitimate secular goals, had enacted a law 
that denied unemployment compensation to persons who refused to do certain work for 
"personal" reasons and were fired and that contained no exception for persons whose refusal was 
religiously m 0 t i ~ a t e d . l ~ ~  He concludes that there is no violation because he finds that where "a 
state has enacted a general statute, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's 
secular goals, the Free Exercise Clause does not, in my view, require the state to conform that 
statute to the dictates of religious conscience to any Direct harm is always prohibited, 
but indirect harm, under which the primary purpose and effect of the statute is secular, is always 
permissible under the free exercise clause. Thus, Rehnquist's approach is always clear and 
consistent. The free exercise clause prohibits direct harm but permits indirect, nondiscriminatory 
harm. 
In addition to having a clear and workable standard for determining what is and is not 
allowed under the establishment clause and free exercise clause, Rehnquist also has a sound 
14' Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, (1981) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting) 
'" Id.. 724. 
approach to reconciling the tension between the two clauses that has been created by the Court. 
In order to diminish the tension, Rehnquist calls for the principle of benevolent neutrality. He 
believes that both the establishment clause and free exercise clause are interpreted too broadly by 
the Court. Rehnquist reiterates that the establishment clause does not require neutrality between 
religion and non-religion, but only among different religions or sects. He believes that the 
establishment clause limits only "government support of proselytizing activities of religious sects 
by throwing the weight of secular [authorities] behind the dissemination of religious tenets."'45 
Under the principle of benevolent neutrality, Rehnquist says that the establishment clause allows 
indirect aid to religion, the natural corollary to which is that the free exercise clause allows 
indirect restriction on the exercise of religion.'46 If the government were sometimes compelled 
to single out religious conduct for exemption, this could be seen as aiding or favoring religion 
within those decisions, conflicting with the establishment clause. Because of the conflict 
between religious liberty and equal treatment between particular sects, according to Rehnquist, 
the government is free to indirectly restrict the exercise of religion, thus reconciling the tension 
between the two clauses, 
Although O'Connor stresses neutrality between religion and ineligon, she believes that 
the conflict between the two clauses can be avoided on the basis of religious liberty. She 
upholds exemptions as part of an overall scheme that treats religion distinctively in order to 
secure religious liberty. However, the fact that religious exemptions treat activity differently 
when performed for religious reasons rather than non-religious reasons conflicts with her 
establishment clause jurisprudence because it may, in some cases, give improper special 
treatment to religion. O'Connor contends that "the solution to the conflict between the Religion 
- 
1 ll5 Id., 726. 
'"Davis 150. 
Clauses lies not in 'neutrality,' but rather in identifying workable limits to the government's 
license to promote the free exercise of re~igion." '~~ However, her reliance on coercion in 
deciding when to use the compelling interest test, as discussed earlier, has not established a 
workable limit to promote the free exercise of religion. It results in discrepancies such as in 
Lyng and Smith, which only further undermines an approach based upon religious liberty. 
Rehnquist's approach offers a better solution to the conflict between religious liberty and 
equal treatment between particular sects because it rules out the possibility that exemptions may 
give improper special treatment to religion. Under O'Connor's approach, the possibility exists 
that exemptions treating activity performed for religious reasons rather than non-religious 
reasons may be seen as special treatment, thus conflicting with her establishment clause standard 
requiring neutrality between religion and irreligion. 
VI. Conclusion 
Overall, Rehnquist has a clear and workable standard for determining what is and is not 
allowed under the establishment clause and free exercise clause. His reliance upon original 
understanding offers a sound approach because he applies it consistently, whereas O'Connor 
does not. Rather, she fails to adopt a single standard of analysis under the establishment clause, 
suggesting a weakness that is inherent in her inconsistent use of original understanding. 
In Grumet, O'Connor fails to adhere to a single test under the establishment clause. She 
discusses four different categories of establishment clause cases and says that different tests 
should be used for each of them. Rather than adhere to one single test for the establishment 
clause, O'Connor prefers to use a case-specific, pragmatic approach. Thus, the argument that the 
establishment clause cannot be reduced to a single, unitary test represents an inconsistency in 
O'Connor's establishment clause analysis. Whereas O'Connor relies upon the endorsement test 
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in Mitchell v. Helms, Rosenberger v. Universily of Virginia, and Lynch v. Donnelly, she suggests 
in Grumet that her endorsement test is not the only test able to be used. This renders her 
interpretation of the establishment clause unclear and contradictory. 
In addition, O'Connor does not distinguish clearly between religion and other beliefs, 
such as personal philosophical choice. Rehnquist, on the other hand, does. He argues that if a 
distinction is not made between religion and personal philosophical choice, far too many 
individuals will be able to get exemptions from far too many laws. Thus, the confusion does not 
exist, like it does under O'Connor's approach, as to whether accommodations should be given to 
all deeply held beliefs, religious or not. 
O'Connor also remains inconsistent in applying more than one test for deciding free 
exercise cases. Her approach in deciding whether or not to use the compelling interest test in 
free exercise cases fails to offer a clear distinction between what she terms coercive burdens and 
incidental burdens upon religion. Thus, it is hard to reconcile what she says in Lyng and what 
she says in Smith. It is extremely difficult to see how a government action that has devastating 
effects on traditional Indian religious practices, which O'Connor admits in her Lyng opinion, 
does not fall under her coercion standard, whereas a law that makes a certain drug illegal, when 
used in a Native American religious ceremony, does. 
Rehnquist, on the other hand, has a clear approach in deciding free exercise cases. He 
relies on a distinction between direct and indirect harm to religion. Thus, he determines that so 
long as a state has enacted a general statute, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the 
State's secular goals, a religion-based exemption is not required under the free exercise clause. 
His approach is consistent and always results in the determination that the free exercise clause 
prohibits direct h a m  to religion and permits indirect, nondiscriminatory harm. 
In addition, Rehnquist's approach on how to reconcile the two clauses is preferable to 
that of O'Connor. Whereas O'Comor believes that the conflict between the two clauses can be 
avoided on the basis of religious liberty, Rehnquist calls for a principle of benevolent neutrality. 
Under O'Connor's approach, the fact that religious exemptions treat activity differently when 
performed for religious reasons conflicts with her establishment clause jurisprudence because it 
may, in some cases, give improper special treatment to religion. In addition, her reliance upon 
coercion has not established a workable limit to promote the free exercise of religion. Rehnquist, 
however, believes that both the establishment clause and the free exercise clause are interpreted 
too broadly by the Court and thus, under the principle of benevolent neutrality, allows for the 
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. As such, he maintains a workable 
standard to determine in which cases accommodations, and thus exemptions, are permitted under 
the religion clauses. Therefore, Rehnquist overall has a clear and workable standard for 
distinguishing between aid or harm that is prohibited by the establishment clause and free 
exercise clause. Such an approach should be adopted by the Court in order to reduce the 
difficulties in establishing a clear, consistent, and practical application of the religion clauses. 
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